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THE LIMITS OF "EXTRAORDINARY POWER": A
SURVEY OF FIRST-DEGREE MURDER APPEALS
UNDER MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL LAWS

CHAPTER 278, SECTION 33E
Stephanie Roberts Hartung*

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ("SJC") frequently

references its "extraordinary power" under Massachusetts General Laws
Chapter 278, § 33E ("Section 33E") when reviewing first-degree murder
convictions on appeal.' Section 33E affords the SJC the power of plenary
review of first-degree murder convictions, and includes a mandate that the
court review the entire record for errors not raised on appeal. 2 The broad
parameters of Section 33E create the potential for a significant number of
reversals on appeal under this provision. 3 To test the validity of this notion,
the survey ("Survey"), which is summarized in this Article, examined firstdegree murder appeals in Massachusetts from January 1, 1998 through
January 1, 2008. 4
This Survey concludes that during the ten-year

* Stephanie Roberts Hartung is an Associate Professor of Legal Writing at Suffolk University
Law School. I wish to thank John M. Greaney, former justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, for his invaluable insights and advice on this project. I am also grateful to my
excellent research assistants, Meredith Reeves and Helene Newberg, for their significant
contributions to this Article.
I See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 754 N.E.2d 685, 689 n.3 (Mass. 2001) (noting "the
defendant requests ... we exercise our extraordinary power under [Massachusetts General Laws
chapter] 278, § 33E").
2

See

JUSTICE JOHN M. GREANEY (RET.) & JAMES F. COMERFORD, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE

IN MASSACHUSETTS 266 (2009) (citations omitted) ("It is often stated that review in connection
with G.L. c. 278, § 33E is 'plenary."'); see also William J. Meade, The History of Capital
Appeals in Massachusetts, 80 IND. L.J. 91, 93 (2005) (Joseph Hoffman speaking) (highlighting
Section 33E passage as catalyst for SJC review of capital cases). In addition, Section 33E gave
the SJC, for the first time, the power to grant a new trial in a capital case. Id. Section 33E also
empowered the SJC to enter a verdict of a lesser degree of guilt. Id.
3 MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 278, § 33E (1998 & Supp. 2010) (authorizing transfer of firstdegree murder cases to SJC "for its consideration of the law and the evidence").
4 For purposes of this Article, "first-degree murder appeals" include appeals to the SJC
following a conviction of first-degree murder pursuant to Section 33E. This Article does not
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timeframe, just 7.5 percent of first-degree murder appeals (a total of
twenty-one cases) resulted in reversal, and not a single case resulted in
reducing the conviction to a lesser offense under Section 33E.z
This Article and Survey provide both criminal practitioners and
academics a practical understanding of the types of homicide-related claims
most likely to succeed on appeal. Specifically, this information will help
practitioners avoid errors at trial likely to result in reversal, as well as help
them craft more effective appellate briefs that appropriately highlight these
issues. Further, academics specializing in criminal law can benefit from a
practical understanding of the issues that are most likely to result in
reversal on appeal.
Part I of this Article is an overview of homicide law in
Massachusetts. 6 Part II explains the appellate procedure governing firstdegree murder convictions in Massachusetts under Section 33E. 7 Part III
provides an overview of the Survey results, along with a comparison to a
analogous multi-state conviction reversal study published in 1989 by the
National Center for State Courts Report. 8 Part IV provides the results of
the Survey of first-degree murder appeals, including a summary of every
case within the Survey that resulted in a reversal. 9
I. THE LAW OF HOMICIDE IN MASSACHUSETTS
Given that murder is viewed as the most grave of all criminal
conduct and consequently results in the longest sentences, a careful review
by the appellate courts is warranted.' 0
Additionally, because the
Massachusetts statute defining murder has remained virtually unchanged
include discussion of appeals from convictions of second-degree murder, manslaughter, or other
vehicle-related homicides.
5 See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (describing data contained in Table 1); see
also infra page 10 tbl. 1.

6 See infra notes 10-31 and accompanying text (providing reader context for
understanding
claims raised on appeal and varying degrees of success).
7 See infra notes 32-45 and accompanying text (setting out procedural context to help reader
understand appellate process in Massachusetts).
8 See infra notes 46-71 and accompanying text (comparing results of this Article's Survey to
results of NCSC Report). See generally Joy A. Chapper & Roger A. Hanson, Understanding
Reversible Error in CriminalAppeals, NAT'L CTR. STATE CTS., 36 (Final Report, October 1989)
[hereinafter NCSC Report], available at http://www.caught.net/caught/reverrctapp.pdf.
9 See infra notes 72-236 and accompanying text (discussing cases resulting in reversal under
Section 33E during timeframe of Survey).

10 See Sean J. Kealy, Hunting the Dragon: Reforming the Afassachusetts Mfurder Statute, 10

B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 203 (2001) (noting '[m]urder is the most serious of all crimes").
Historically, "[d]eath was the punishment for 'first-degree' murders and [1]ife imprisonment was
the punishment for all other murders." Id. at 211.
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for over 150 years," most homicide reversals on appeal presumably result
from substantive or procedural issues that are not the result of changes in
the statutory language. 12
Homicide is defined as the unjustified killing of a person by
another person.' 3 Under Massachusetts law, homicide is divided into
14
several categories, depending on the defendant's degree of culpability.
15
states.
This approach to homicide prosecution is typical in most
A. First-DegreeMurder

Massachusetts

statutory law defines first-degree

murder as

"[m]urder committed with deliberately premeditated malice aforethought,
or with extreme atrocity or cruelty, or in the commission or attempted16
commission of a crime punishable with death or imprisonment for life.'
Thus, a defendant can be properly convicted of first-degree murder where

11 See Kealy, supra note 10, at 204 (noting "murder statute, in fact, has effectively gone
untouched by the Legislature since 1858."). See generally MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 (2008
& Supp. 2010).
12 See Kealy, supra note 10, at 258-59 (noting unfettered SJC interpretation discretion results
from unchanged status of Massachusetts murder statute).
13 See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 352 N.E.2d 203, 206 (Mass. 1976) (noting
manslaughter and murder as unlawful killings). In holding the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury regarding the prosecution's burden to prove the defendant did not act in selfdefense, the SJC stated, "we have long recognized that self-defense negates the element of
'unlawfulness.' Homicide 'may be lawful or unlawful ....

It may also be justifiable, and of

course lawful, in necessary self-defense."' Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295,
304 (1850)); see also Colette T. Tvedt, Homicide in Massachusetts:An Introduction, in TRYING
MURDER AND OTHER HOMICIDE CASES IN MASSACHUSETTS, § 1.1 (Mass. Continuing Legal

Educ., 2006) (discussing definition of first-degree murder in Massachusetts).
14 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 (2008 & Supp. 2010) (defining first-degree murder).
The statute reads in pertinent part, "[m]urder which does not appear to be in the first degree is
murder in the second degree. Petit treason shall be prosecuted and punished as murder. The
degree of murder shall be found by the jury." Id.; see also Kealy, supra note 10, at 249 ("The
inclusion of premeditation in first-degree murder statutes indicates that a person who plans ahead
is worse than is the person who kills on sudden impulse."). "'Premeditated' killings are not
necessarily the worst crimes, in fact, many unpremeditated killings shock society's conscience
more than premeditated murders." See Kealy, supra note 10, at 248.
15 See Kealy, supra note 10, at 245-50 (stating most states define murder by statute and
divide it into two degrees). "Murders perpetrated by means of poison, by lying in wait, or by any
other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or those killings committed during the
perpetration of an arson, rape, robbery or burglary, are commonly deemed 'murder in the firstdegree."' Id. at 253. Other forms of murder deemed less serious, fall under a catchall "murder in
the second degree" category, which is punished less severely. Id.; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §
187, 198 (West 2010) (delineating murder by first and second degree); FLA. STAT. § 782.04
(2010) (dividing murder prosecutions into first and second degree categories); ILL. COMP. STAT.
38/9-1, 38/9-2 (2010) (categorizing murder by first and second degree).
16 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 (2008 & Supp. 2010) (defining first-degree murder).
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the prosecutor has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant
committed an unlawful killing; (2) with malice; and (3) with deliberate
premeditation. 17 This statutory language has remained fundamentally
unchanged since its inception in 1858.18
Under Massachusetts common law, malice is considered to be the
"essential element" of murder. 19 The malice element can be established in
one of three possible ways. Malice can be satisfied by proof that the
defendant either intended to kill the victim or to cause grievous bodily
harm. 20 Additionally, "third-prong malice" can be established where the
defendant's actions created a "plain and strong likelihood that death will

follow."21
B. Second-DegreeMurder
The Massachusetts statute defines second-degree murder as the
catch-all category for any murder which does not fit the first-degree murder
definition. 22 Because second-degree murder is based on less blameworthy
conduct, sentencing is substantially more lenient than for first-degree
murder. 23 Under Massachusetts law, second-degree murder convictions do
not fall within the parameters of Section 33E and thus are not considered in
this study.24

17

See Instructionsfor Specific Crimes: Crimes of Homicide, in MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR

COURT CRIMINAL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS,

Educ., 1999 & Supp. 2003).

at Chapter 2, Part I (Mass. Continuing Legal

18 Kealy, supra note 10, at 204 ("[T]he restatement of the law [of homicide in
Massachusetts] occurred outside the legislative system and therefore, may not reflect how the
public believes murder is defined and its appropriate punishment. The murder statute, in fact, has
effectively gone untouched by the Legislature since 1858.").
19 See Lannon v. Commonwealth, 400 N.E.2d 862, 865 (Mass. 1980) (discussing substantive
distinction between manslaughter and murder).
20 See Christopher Skinner, Jury Instructionsand the Law of Homicide, in TRYING MURDER
AND OTHER HOMICIDE CASES, § 2.2.1 (Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., 2004) (providing
overview of malice element of murder at common law in Massachusetts).
21 See Skinner, supra note 20, § 2.2.1 (summarizing "third prong malice" doctrine under
Massachusetts law).
22 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 1 (2008 & Supp. 2010) ("Murder which does not appear to
be in the first degree is murder in the second degree.").
23 See Kealy, supra note 10, at 253 (discussing relative gravity of murder in first and second
degrees). "In Massachusetts, the difference in penalty between first and second-degree murder is
great; those convicted of second-degree murder are eligible for parole after serving fifteen years
of a life sentence while those convicted of first-degree murder have no chance at parole." Id.
24 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 33E (1998 & Supp. 2010) (restricting Section 33E
"capital case" review to first-degree murder convictions).
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C. Felony Murder
Another theory upon which first-degree murder can be established
is felony murder. 25 Under common law in Massachusetts, first-degree
murder can be established by demonstrating the defendant's intent to

commit a specific enumerated felony.26

This intent substitutes for the

malice requirement. 27
While felony murder is unpopular among
academics, it is widely employed by prosecutors. 28 The primary criticism
of the felony murder doctrine centers around the perceived disconnect
between the defendant's degree of culpability and the resulting

punishment. 29

In particular, the possibility that a defendant could be

punished for first-degree murder for conduct which amounts to mere
recklessness or criminally negligent conduct is the crux of the debate.3 o In
spite of this academic debate, the felony murder doctrine is commonly
employed in the prosecution of homicide cases in Massachusetts. 3'

25

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 33E (1998 & Supp. 2010); see also Kealy, supra note

10, at 237 (discussing felony murder theory in Massachusetts). "The felony murder rule punishes
all homicides committed in the perpetration of a felony whether the death is intentional,
unintentional or accidental, without the necessity of proving the relation of the perpetrator's state
of mind to the homicide." See Kealy, supra note 10, at 237.
26 See Skinner, supra note 20, § 2.4.1 ("At common law, murder [can] be established by
proof of malice aforethought or by reliance on the common law felony murder rule that holds that
the defendant's intent to commit the underlying felony substitutes for the 'malice' element
otherwise required for a conviction of murder.") (emphasis in original).
27 See Skinner, supra note 20, § 2.4.1 ("[N]one of the 'justifications,' 'excuses,'
or
,mitigations' that may negate 'malice' in a nonfelony murder prosecution are available to the
defendant as a defense to felony murder.").
28 Compare David Crump, Reconsidering the Felony Murder Rule in Light of Modern
Criticisms: Doesn't the Conclusion Depend Upon the ParticularRule at Issue?, 32 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1155, 1156 (2009) ("The felony murder doctrine has long been a target for detractors
....
There was a time when virtually no commentator could find anything to say in favor of
retaining the rule, even though it had proven extraordinarily durable over time and almost every
state had chosen to retain it."), with Leonard Birdsong, Felony Murder: A HistoricalPerspective
by Which to UnderstandToday's Modern Felony Murder Rule Statutes, 32 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
1, 3 (2006) ("A number of commentators criticize the felony murder rule and some believe that
its use should be abolished in the United States. Despite such criticism, its continued use by
prosecutors persists in most American states.").
29 See Crump, supra note 28, at 1159 ("The chief complaint of the MPC [Model Penal
Code] drafters appears to be that the felony murder doctrine results in convictions unrelated to
individual blameworthiness.").
30 See Birdsong, supra note 28, at 1 (discussing parameters of felony murder rule). Under
the common law, if a person is killed during an act that amounts to a felony, that killing is
automatically murder. Id. Intent of the individual perpetrating the killing, potentially negligent
behavior or reckless disregard of human life are all irrelevant. Id.
31 See Skinner, supra note 20, § 2.3 (summarizing multiple Massachusetts cases prosecuted
under felony murder theory). See generally Commonwealth v. Prater, 725 N.E.2d 233 (Mass.
2000); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 714 N.E.2d 813 (Mass. 1999); Commonwealth v. Doe, 648
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II. APPELLATE PROCEDURE FOR HOMICIDE CASES
IN MASSACHUSETTS
Although direct

appeals from most criminal convictions

in

Massachusetts are initially brought before the Massachusetts Appeals Court
("Appeals Court"), convictions of first-degree murder are appealed directly
to the SJC.32 Such direct appeals to the SJC receive a substantially more
expansive review.33

Under Section 33E, the SJC must review not only

those claims raised by counsel on appeal, but must also review the entire
record to ensure the trial result is consistent with "jUStiCe." 3 4 This
provision allows for a two-part review, in addition to a standard review of
alleged errors raised by objection at trial.35 First, the SJC reviews each
case for unpreserved errors which give rise to "a substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice. 3 6 Second, the court reviews the complete record
for overall "fairness" in order to determine whether the conviction should
be reversed to a lesser offense or a new trial should be granted. 17
Another notable aspect of this appellate provision is that Section
33E allows the SJC to review the record for errors not objected to by trial
counsel under a more relaxed standard of review.38 While the applicable
standard of review in Massachusetts for errors not objected to at trial is a
"substantial risk of the miscarriage of justice," under Section 33E, the less
stringent standard of a "substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice"

N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1995); Commonwealth v. Quigley, 462 N.E.2d 92 (Mass. 1984).
32 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 33E (1998 & Supp. 2010); see also Eric D. Blumenson,
Stanley Z. Fisher, & Daniel Kanstroom, MASSACHUSETTS CRIMINAL PRACTICE

§

1.2.2 (Lexis

Law Publishing 1998) (discussing appellate procedure for homicide cases in Massachusetts).
33 See Greaney & Comerford, supra note 2, at 264 ("Where a defendant is convicted of
murder in the first degree, however, G.L. c. 278, § 33E requires an automatic transfer of 'the
whole case' to the Supreme Judicial Court 'for its consideration of the law and the evidence. "').
34 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 33E (citing two remedies, new trial or reduced verdict,
for newly discovered evidence or "any other reason that justice may require").
35 See Greaney & Comerford, supra note 2, at 264 ("Apart from reviewing alleged errors that
are preserved by objection or rulings on motions, the mandate under Section 33E provides the
defendant a two-part level of review.").
36 See Greaney & Comerford, supra note 2, at 264 (discussing applicable standards of review
for jury instruction error).
37 See Greaney & Comerford, supra note 2, at 265 ("[T]he court also considers generally the
fairness of the verdict to see whether a reduction in the verdict is warranted or a new trial should
be granted.").
38 See Meade, supra note 2, at 94 (Hoffman speaking) ("Even perhaps more remarkable, the
court can raise errors or claims and review things sua sponte, things that no one had raised."); see
also Greaney & Comerford, supra note 2, at 264 (citing Commonwealth v. Lennon, 504 N.E.2d
1051, 1055 n. 6 (1987) (noting difference between use of "risk" versus "likelihood" in two
different standards of review)).
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applies.39 Finally, under Section 33E, during the direct appellate process,

the SIC has exclusive jurisdiction over all motions for a new trial filed with
the trial court. 40

Although the Massachusetts trial courts also have

unusually broad-reaching and verdict-reducing powers under Rule 25(b)(2)
of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, these powers have

rarely been invoked.4'
Section 33E empowers the SIC to review the entire trial transcript

and reduce a first-degree murder conviction to a lesser offense in the
interest ofjustice. 42 In exercising this "extraordinary power," the court has

considered such factors as: (1) the spontaneity of the defendant's behavior;
(2) the relationship between the parties; (3) the personal characteristics of
the defendant; and (4) lack of evidence of motive. 43 However, despite its
clear authority, the SIC has only invoked this power to reduce the
conviction under Section 33E a total of twenty-five times in its history.44
Moreover, during the time of this Survey,45the SIC has repeatedly declined
to invoke its authority under Section 33E.
Given the expansive protections available to the defendant under
Section 33E, the potential exists for a significant number of first-degree
murder convictions to be reduced or reversed. However, the results of the

39
40

Greaney & Comerford, supra note 2, at 264.
See Meade, supra note 2, at 93 (Hoffman speaking) (noting trial judges' power to order

new trial in capital cases before Section 33E enactment).
41 See Benjamin B. Tymann, Note, Populism and the Rule of Law: Rule 25(b)(2) of the
Massachusetts Rules of CriminalProcedure and the HistoricalRelationship Between Juries and
Judges in the Commonwealth's Trial Courts, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 125, 127 (2000) (dubbing
Rule 25 (b)(2) "an extraordinarily powerful tool" Massachusetts trial judges, surprisingly, rarely
invoke).
42 See Greaney & Comerford, supra note 2, at 269 (highlighting 1962 amendment gave SJC
duty to consider guilt degree in first-degree murder convictions).
43 See Commonwealth v. McDermott, 471 N.E.2d 1302, 1308 (Mass. 1984) (focusing on
defendant's young age and lack of education in reducing verdict); Commonwealth v. Dalton, 431
N.E.2d 203, 208 (Mass. 1982) (citing close relationship of parties in reducing verdict);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 323 N.E.2d 726, 729 (Mass. 1975) (describing lack of history between
defendant and victim); Commonwealth v. Williams, 301 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Mass. 1973) (noting
lack of premeditation in reducing verdict). See generally Greaney & Comerford, supra note 2, at
269-72.
44 See Greaney & Comerford, supra note 2, at 269-72 (finding SJC reduced verdict in 25
cases since 1962 amendment).
45 See Commonwealth v. Burton, 876 N.E.2d 411,419 (Mass. 2007) (declining to grant relief
under Section 33E). The SJC reduced the conviction from first-degree to second-degree murder
outside the parameters of Section 33E because the predicate offense to felony murder did not
carry possible sentence of life in prison. Id. at 413; see also Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 877
N.E.2d 232, 236 (Mass. 2007) (declining to grant relief under Section 33E); Commonwealth v.
Jackson, 855 N.E.2d 1097, 1098 (Mass. 2006) (declining to "exercise [the] power to reduce the
murder verdict or order a new trial"); Commonwealth v. Leahy, 838 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (Mass.
2005) (declining to reduce verdict under Section 33E).
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Survey, discussed in detail below, indicate the opposite conclusion.
III. OVERALL RESULTS: COMPARISON TO THE NCSC REPORT
Although the important function performed by the state appellate
courts in correcting trial court errors is not disputed, 46 there seems to be
very little review of conviction reversal rates .4 Notably, there appears to
be no similar recent survey in publication that analyzes appellate reversal
rates of criminal convictions with a particular focus on the substantive legal
issues raised on appeal. 4 The most recent survey of this nature is the
National Center for State Courts' report titled UnderstandingReversible
Errorin CriminalAppeals ("NCSC Report"), published in 1989. Although
published over twenty years ago and substantially larger in scope than this
Survey, the NCSC Report provides a helpful point of comparison, given
that the appellate practices of five different state appellate courts are
reviewed.
A. Parametersof the NCSC Report
The NCSC Report involved a study of five different "state
appellate courts hearing first-level criminal appeals." 49 The five courts
involved were: (1) the California Court of Appeal, Third District; (2) the
Colorado Court of Appeals; (3) the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth
District; (4) the Maryland Court of Special Appeals; and, (5) the Rhode
Island Supreme Court. 50 The NCSC Report studied appeals from all
criminal convictions. 5 1 Homicides and other violent crimes constituted just
over 50 percent of the total appeals reviewed. 52
The overall affirmance rate of the five courts reviewed in the study
was 70.8 percent. 53 The NCSC Report further categorized non-affirmances
46

See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 13 (noting first-level appellate court decisions'

educational potential to identify difficulties for trial courts).
47 See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 29 ("Very little is known about the business of firstlevel appeals courts, other than the fact that there is a lot of it and much of it is considered by
judges and attorneys to be routine.") (citations omitted).
48

See generally Alan Rogers, The Death Penalty and Reversible Error in Massachusetts, 6

L. REV. 515, 515-32 (2008) (surveying Massachusetts homicide reversals from 1805 to
1996 emphasizing history of capital murder appellate procedure).
49 See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 3.
50 NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 3 (detailing data set of roughly 1,750 appeals in which
appellate courts considered approximately 3,800 issues).
51 See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 31.
52 See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 31.
53 See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 5.
PIERCE

2011]

LIMITS OF "EXTRA ORDINARY POWER"

as: acquittal, granting of a new trial, re-sentencing, and "other. 5 4 Those
appeals resulting in a reversal of the criminal conviction accounted for 8.5
percent of the total . Although the NCSC Report reviewed appeals from
convictions of all types of crimes, it did not find a significant statistical
difference in the affirmance rate based on the type of crime or severity of
sentence.5 6 Instead, the results of the NCSC Report indicated that the type
of issue raised on appeal is more closely related to the affirmance rate
outcome. 57 The NCSC Report also found no statistical correlation between
success rate on appeal and representation by privately-retained counsel
versus court-appointed counsel.58
B. Comparison of MassachusettsSurvey Results to the NCSC Report
Although the NCSC Report is substantially broader in scope than
this Survey, a comparison of the results is notable because in spite of the
SJC's broad powers of review under Section 33E, the Massachusetts
reversal rate is lower than the reversal rate set out in the NCSC Report.59
Between January 1, 1998, and January 1, 2008, 280 first-degree murder
convictions were appealed directly to the SIC pursuant to Section 33E. 6 °
Of those appeals, twenty-one convictions (7.5 percent) were reversed. 6 '
The other 259 first-degree murder convictions from this timeframe (92.5
percent) were affirmed.62 The 7.5 percent reversal rate in this Survey is
one percent lower than the 8.5 percent reversal rate in the NCSC Report.63
Table 1 below illustrates the overall affirmance rate for first-degree
murder appeals within this Survey.

54 See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 5.
55 See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 14.
56

See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 20 (finding relative frequency of error not strongly

related to underlying offense or severity of sentence).
57 See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 6.
58 See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 40 (finding overall five-court pattern indicates
"virtually no difference in outcome by counsel type"). Moreover, the NCSC Report indicates "all
are within one-half percentage point of the five-court average." Id.
59 See NCSC Report, supra note 9, at 14 (discussing results of NCSC Report); see also infra
notes 60-74 (displaying Survey results for this Article).
60 See infra page 10 tbl. 1.
61 See infra page 10 tbl. 1.
62 See infra page 10 tbl. 1.
63 See infra page 10 tbl. 1; see also NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 14.
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Table 1
Overall Affirmance Rate of MA First-degree Murder Appeals to SJC

Appeal Outcomes

Total #

Percentage

Affirmed

259

92.50%

Reversed

21

7.50%

Total Cases Appealed
64
Table 2 breaks down each of the twenty-one reversals by issue.
Most cases within this Survey raised multiple issues on appeal. The issues
successfully raised on appeal within the scope of this Survey can be
categorized as follows: jury instruction error, evidentiary error, sufficiency
of evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct,
and discovery error. 6' This Survey chronicles both the number of times
each of these issues was raised and the number of times it resulted in
reversal.66

Table 2
Reversible Error by Issue
Raw Data
Type of Issue

# of Times Raised

# of Times Reversed

Evidence

177

5

Jury Instruction
Sufficiency of Evidence
Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
Prosecutorial Misc.
Discovery

6,4
65
66

See supra page 10 Nb.2.
See supra page 10 Nb.2.
See supra page 10 Nb.2.
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Table 3 presents the breakdown of reversible error issues by
percentages.6 7 Specifically, this table illustrates what percentage of the
total reversals was based on each particular issue. 68 For example,
evidentiary issues accounted for 23.8 percent of the total number of
reversals within this Survey. 69 Additionally,
Table 3 illustrates the success
rate of each type of issue raised. 70 This figure was calculated by dividing
the number of reversals based on a particular issue by the total number
of
71
times that issue was raised in the ten-year time frame of this Survey.
Table 3
Reversible Errorby Issue
Percentages
Type of Issue

% Error relating to
this issue

Success Rate of this
issue

Evidence

23.8%

2.82%

Jury Instruction

38.09%

4.73%

Sufficiency of Evidence

9.52%

3.85%

Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel

19.04%

4.04%

Prosecutorial Misc.

9.52%

2.17%

Discovery

0%

0%

IV. SUMMARY OF FIRST-DEGREE MURDER
REVERSALS BY ISSUE
Below is a comprehensive summary of each of the twenty cases
that resulted in reversal within the scope of this Survey. These summaries
are organized by issue, beginning with jury instruction error: the issue
resulting in the most reversals.

67
68
69

70
71

See
See
See
See
See

supra page
supra page
supra page
supra page
supra page

11
11
11
11
11

tbl.
tbl.
tbl.
tbl.
tbl.

3.
3.
3.
3.
3.
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A. Jury InstructionError
Jury instruction errors account for the largest number of reversals
within this Survey, and are also the type of error most likely to result in
reversal, with a 4.73 percent success rate.72 Among the cases reversed on
appeal within the scope of this Survey, 38.09 percent were based on jury
instruction error.73 In total, jury instruction error was raised 169 times,
with eight of these cases resulting
in reversal on appeal during the ten-year
74
time frame of this Survey.
Notably, in 1999, early in the time frame of this Survey, the SJC
developed the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide for Massachusetts trial
courts, which specifically focuses on homicide cases. 75 The purpose of
these instructions is to aid both criminal practitioners and the trial courts in
crafting proper jury instructions for each given case. 76
1. Standard of Review for Jury Instruction Error
Under Massachusetts common law, the failure to object to a jury
instruction at trial substantially alters the applicable standard of review on
appeal.7 7 Where defense counsel fails to adequately preserve the issue at
trial,78 even under the broader parameters of Section 33E, the SJC will
review for only those errors resulting in a "substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice. 79 However, where a jury instruction error is

72

See supra page 11 tbl. 3.

73 See supra page 11 tbl. 3.
74 See supra page 10 tbl. 2.
75 See generally Colleen A. Tynan,

Afurder Cases Reversed Within Last 10 Years and Those

That Should Have Been Reversed, in TRYING MURDER AND OTHER HOMICIDE CASES IN
MASSACHUSETTS, Appendix E (Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., 2004); see also MASSACHUSETTS
SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.4.2 (Mass. Continuing Legal
Educ., 1999 & Supp. 2003) (codifying jury instructions).
76 See MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL PRACTICE JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.1.1

(Mass. Continuing Legal Educ. 1999 & Supp. 2003) ("The Model Instructions are not intended to
be a comprehensive statement of the law but rather to provide guidance on those instructions that
are frequently given at trials of homicide cases.").
77 See Tynan, supra note 75 (noting differing standard of review depending on whether
counsel objected to jury instructions at trial).
78 See Tynan, supra note 75 (noting counsel must object to preserve jury instruction error).
There are three opportunities for counsel to object and preserve jury instruction error for appellate
review: (1) at the charge conference when the court indicates that a requested instruction will not
be given; (2) at the close of the jury charge; and (3) again at the end of any supplemental
instructions. Id.
79 See Commonwealth v. Gabbidon, 494 N.E.2d 1317, 1319 (Mass. 1986) (discussing
standard of review).
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properly preserved at trial, the SIC determines if the instructions were
erroneous, and if so, whether the error was "harmless." 80
This
harmlessness standard is substantially lower and presumably would result
in a significantly higher number of reversals. Massachusetts' criminal
defense practitioners are strongly advised to give substantial thought and
consideration to jury instructions in a murder trial and to object when the
trial judge is unwilling to give the requested jury instructions. 8 ' In spite of
the emphasis on jury instructions, notably, of the eight jury instructionrelated reversals within this Survey, not a single
one involved an objection
82
to the erroneous instruction at the trial level.
2. Cases Resulting in Reversal Based on Jury Instruction Error
Of the eight reversals based on jury instruction error, there were
only three underlying substantive issues that gave rise to the erroneous
instructions: (1) third-prong malice, (2) provocation as a defense to firstdegree murder, and (3) expert testimony and burden of proof.83 Four of the
eight jury instruction reversal cases involved third-prong malice.84 Three
of the eight cases involved erroneous instructions relating to provocation as
a defense to first-degree murder.85 The single remaining jury instruction
reversal case involved expert testimony and the applicable burden of

so

See Commonwealth v. Palmer, 796 N.E.2d 423, 424-25 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (noting

relatively lower standard of review where objection to jury instruction made at trial).
81 See Skinner, supra note 20, § 2.1 (noting importance and difficulty of jury instruction in
trial practice). "The significance of this stage of trial preparation is amplified in murder cases
because the stakes are so high, but also because the law itself can be so complex." Id.
82 See Commonwealth v. Hinds, 875 N.E.2d 488, 497 (Mass. 2007) (reversing trial court
decision due to improper jury instruction regarding expert testimony); Commonwealth v. Azar,
760 N.E.2d 1224, 1236 (Mass. 2002) (remanding for new trial due to improper jury instruction
regarding third-prong malice); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 754 N.E.2d 685, 692 (Mass. 2001)
(concluding improper jury instruction regarding third-prong malice constituted substantial
miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v. Lapage, 759 N.E.2d 300, 307-08 (Mass. 2001)
(reversing trial court decision due to improper jury instruction regarding provocation);
Commonwealth v. Little, 730 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Mass. 2000) (holding "errors in portions of the
instructions to the jury on voluntary manslaughter created a substantial likelihood of a
miscarriage of justice"); Commonwealth v. Carlino, 710 N.E.2d 967, 971 (Mass. 1999) (reversing
trial court decision due to improper jury instruction regarding expert testimony); Commonwealth
v. Vizcarrondo, 693 N.E.2d 677, 682 (Mass. 1998) (reversing due to improper jury instruction
regarding third-prong malice); Commonwealth v. Williams, 701 N.E.2d 945, 950-51 (Mass.
1998) (holding erroneous third-prong malice instruction warranted new trial).
83 See cases cited supra note 82 and accompanying text (listing cases where improper jury
instruction resulted in reversal).
84 See Azar, 760 N.E.2d at 1236; Johnson, 754 N.E.2d at 692; Vizcarrondo, 693 N.E.2d at
682; Williams, 701 N.E.2d at 946.
85 See Lapage, 759 N.E.2d at 307-08; Little, 730 N.E.2d at 306; Car/no,710 N.E.2d at 971.
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proof .6
a. Third-ProngMalice InstructionErrors
It is striking that fully half of the jury instruction reversals within7
this Survey stemmed from erroneous instructions on third-prong malice.
In particular, these cases involved an instruction in the Superior Court
advising "[m]alice aforethought may be inferred if from the circumstances
known to the Defendant, a reasonably prudent person would have known
that according to common experience there was a plain and strong
likelihood that death or grievous bodily harm would follow the
contemplated act."88
The SIC has repeatedly held that the inclusion of the "grievous
bodily harm" language in this instruction is reversible error.8 9 The SIC has
reasoned that this instruction improperly lessens the burden of proof,
resulting in the possibility of a defendant being convicted of first-degree
murder without proof of the requisite intent. 90 Below is a summary of each
case reversed on appeal within this Survey for jury instruction error relating
to third-prong malice.
i. Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo9l
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder based upon the
death of a ten-month-old child. 92 The defendant was alone with the victim
at the time of her death, and subsequently claimed she had rolled off the
bed and begun to cry before losing consciousness. 93 Medical testimony at
trial established the cause of death to be severe blunt force trauma resulting
94
from four or more blows to the body, and not consistent with a fall.
The erroneous jury instruction suggested jurors could infer malice

See Hinds, 875 N.E.2d at 497.
See cases cited supra note 84 (listing cases involving third-prong malice).
88 Vizcarrondo, 693 N.E.2d at 680 n.4 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
89 See cases cited supra note 84.
90 See Vizcarrondo, 693 N.E.2d at 681 (stating due process violated if murder conviction
rests upon state of mind sufficient only for manslaughter).
91 693 N.E.2d 677 (Mass. 1999).
92 See id. at 679.
93 See id. at 679-80 (reviewing relevant facts of case).
94 See id. at 679. In addition to the blows, human bite marks were present on several places
of the baby's body. Id. Medical testimony also noted the baby's injuries were not consistent with
"falling to the ground with an adult, being hit in the abdomen by an adult's elbow as the adult
tripped, or being dropped from an adult's arms." Id.
86

87
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aforethought if "from the circumstances known to the Defendant, a
reasonably prudent person would have known that according to common
experience there was a plain and strong likelihood that death or grievous
bodily harm would follow the contemplated act." 95 In finding reversible
error, the SIC noted the inclusion of the "grievous bodily harm" language
effectively resulted in equating the requirements of third-prong malice with
"wanton and reckless conduct" for purposes of involuntary manslaughter. 96
The court further reasoned that such a lessening of the burden of proof
97
would violate due process.
ii. Commonwealth v. Williams9"
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder after beating
the victim to death with his fists. 99 The defendant believed the victim, a
cab driver, was responsible for the recent rape of his sister, and engaged in
the beating as an act of vengeance. 100 The SIC found the trial court's
inclusion of the "grievous bodily harm" language in the jury instruction
improperly lowered the Commonwealth's burden of establishing malice
aforethought beyond a reasonable doubt.'10 In arriving at this conclusion,
the court reasoned that in spite of the prolonged nature of the attack, the
instruction was misleading because a jury could reasonably find that
beating with
fists is not an act which creates "a plain and strong likelihood
02
of death." 1
iii. Commonwealth v. Johnsonl°3
The inebriated defendant killed one person after firing multiple
gunshots into a group of people following a verbal altercation. 104 Again,
95 Id. (emphasis in original).
96 See Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 693 N.E.2d 677, 680 (Mass. 1998).
97 See id. at 681 ("[A conviction for murder based upon a state of mind sufficient only to
support manslaughter] is also inconsistent with the principle that criminal liability and
punishment for an act should be proportionate to the actor's moral culpability for that act.").
98 701 N.E.2d 945 (Mass. 1998).
99 Id. at 946-947 (detailing facts of case).
100 See id. Before the beating took place, the defendant saw the victim at a gasoline station,
and called his sister to come there to identify him as her rapist. Id. She arrived and said "that's
him" upon seeing the victim. Id.
101 See id. at 947-49 (detailing court's reasoning underlying reversal).
102 See id. at 948.
103 754 N.E.2d 685 (Mass. 2001).
104 Id. at 689-90 (detailing facts of case). Witnesses stated they saw the defendant drinking a
number of alcoholic beverages over the course of several hours. Id. at 689-90. While involved in
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the court focused on the trial judge's inclusion of the phrase "grievous
bodily harm" in the jury instruction relating to malice. 105 The court
acknowledged that under certain circumstances, a complete and accurate
instruction on deliberate premeditation can cure an erroneous malice
instruction, however, it found no such clarification occurred here. 106 In
reversing the conviction, the SIC noted that because "mental impairment
was a live issue," the inaccurate jury instructions left open the possibility
that the jury convicted the defendant for first-degree murder based on
something less than either an
intent to kill, or on one of the other
07
permissible prongs of malice. 1
iv.Commonwealth v. Azar

°8

The defendant was convicted in the death of his four-month-old
daughter, who he was alone with at the time of her death. 10 9 There was
contradictory evidence submitted at trial as to the severity and cause of the
victim's injuries."10 The defendant testified he found the victim "limp" in
her crib, picked her up and inadvertently dropped her while trying to call
his wife."' The autopsy report indicated fresh bruising all over her body,
along with multiple fractured ribs and leg bones, none of which appeared to
have caused her death.112 The autopsy also revealed severe head injuries
and other physical evidence consistent with the victim being swung by her
ankles and slammed against a wall or other hard surface. "i3 The defense's
medical experts disputed the evidence supporting this theory. 114
In finding reversible error, the SIC cited to the trial court's

an argument at a restaurant, an off-duty police officer approached the defendant and asked him
and his friends to leave. Id. at 690. Later outside the restaurant, the off-duty police officer and
his friends heard footsteps, turned and saw the defendant fire his gun at them. Id.
105 Id. at 693 (noting judge's instructions permitted jury to convict based upon proof burden
akin to manslaughter).
106 Id. at 693 ("'[H]ere the judge did not clearly inform the jury that they must find the plan,
the decision to kill after a period of deliberation, and then the resolution to kill. Rather, he
intermingled within his definition of deliberate premeditation the erroneous second and third
prongs of malice .....
107 Id. at 693-94.
108 760 N.E.2d 1224 (Mass. 2002).
109 Id. at 1226-27.
110 Id. at 1227 (discussing varying medical testimony about victim's injuries and cause of
death).

III Id. at 1227-28.
112 SeeAzar, 760 N.E.2d at 1228.

See Commonwealth v. Azar, 760 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 (Mass. 2002).
id. at 1229 (noting defense medical experts' testimony about victim's injuries aligned
with defendant's testimony of what occurred).
113

114 See
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improper inclusion of the "grievous bodily harm" language in the definition
of third-prong malice." 5 Further, the trial court never properly instructed
the jury that third-prong malice permits an inference of malice only where
a reasonable jury would recognize that the defendant's acts created a "plain
and strong likelihood of death." 116 Again, the court reasoned that this type
of erroneous instruction improperly blurred the line between
the
7
requirements of first-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter."
b. ProvocationInstruction Error
The next most common type of jury instruction error involves
provocation and burden of proof. As discussed above, three of the eight
cases where jury instruction errors resulted in reversal within the
parameters of this Survey were based upon improper jury instructions as to
provocation, and the applicable burden of proof in establishing this
defense." 8 A correct statement of the provocation rule is "where the
evidence raises the possibility that the defendant may have acted on
reasonable provocation the Commonwealth must prove . . . beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act on reasonable
provocation."" 9 Below is a summary of each of the three cases reversed on
appeal for jury instruction error based on provocation.
120

i. Commonwealth v. Lapage

In this case, the defendant argued self-defense at trial.' 2 1 The
evidence established that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol
and cocaine when he and his girlfriend (the victim) became involved in a
verbal and physical altercation. 2 2 Both the defendant and victim had
knives, and the altercation ended with the defendant stabbing the victim in

115

Id. at 1230-31 (discussing trial court's frequent use of "grievous bodily harm" reference

in jury instruction).
116 Id. at 1231.
Additionally, the trial court judge neglected to provide the jury with
instructions on the subjective component of third prong malice. Id. at 1231 n.4.
117 See Azar, 760 N.E.2d at 1232 (calling judge's instructions deficient).
118 See cases cited supra note 85 and accompanying text (listing cases reversing first-degree
murder conviction due to incorrect jury instruction on provocation).
119 Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 695 N.E.2d 1065, 1067 (Mass. 1998).
120 759 N.E.2d 300 (Mass. 2001).
121See id. at 302.
122See id. at 302-03 (discussing defendant's significant drug use as catalyst for argument
between defendant and victim).
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the neck, resulting in her death. 123 At trial the defense advanced a theory of
voluntary manslaughter based on provocation because the defendant had
either "acted on reasonable provocation or had used excessive force in selfdefense.',124 The SJC found the trial court incorrectly instructed as to the
burden of proof on provocation. 125 In particular, the trial court improperly
stated "to prove the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the
Commonwealth must prove . . .beyond a reasonable doubt . . .that the
defendant
• ,126injured [the victim] as a result of sudden combat or in the heat of
passion.
The court cited its decision in Commonwealth v. Acevedo 127 in
highlight the improper burden-shifting caused by this instruction. 128
ii. Commonwealth v. Little29
At trial, there was no dispute that the defendant shot and killed the
victim during the course of an argument, rather, the central issue before the
jury was whether the defendant acted in self-defense. 30 The defendant
believed the victim was reaching for a gun in his waistband just before the
defendant shot him.'3 On appeal, the Commonwealth conceded that the
jury instructions regarding voluntary manslaughter were erroneous, but
maintained the defendant was not entitled to the instruction at all based
upon the facts presented at trial. 3 2 The SJC concluded, based upon the
evidence, that the judge should have instructed the jury "if the
Commonwealth had not proved the absence of provocation beyond a
reasonable doubt, there could be no finding of malice and hence no
conviction of murder."' 33 The SJC further noted that the trial court had

123
124
125

See id. at 303-04 (recounting details of altercation between defendant and victim).
Lapage, 759 N.E.2d at 302.
See Commonwealth v. Lapage, 759 N.E.2d 300, 305 (Mass. 2001) (agreeing with defense

assertion of substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice).
126 Id. at 304 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
127 695 N.E.2d 1065 (Mass. 1998).
128 See Lapage, 759 N.E 2d at 305 (construing Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 695 N.E.2d
1065, 1066 (Mass. 1998)).
129730 N.E.2d 304 (Mass 2000).
130 See id. at 306 (noting critical issues at trial).

The key questions were whether the

defendant committed murder, acted in self-defense, or, "if
the killing was unlawful, whether the

defendant was guilty only of manslaughter." Id.
131
132

See id. at 307-08 (detailing facts leading up to shooting incident).
See Little, 730 N.E.2d at 306 ("The Commonwealth... maintains [the instruction errors]

are of no legal significance because the defendant was not entitled to instructions on the disputed
points, and, even if he was so entitled, the instructions, considered as a whole, could not have
misled the jury.").
133 Id. at 308.
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13 4
misplaced the burden of proof, in direct violation of Acevedo.

iii. Commonwealth v. Carlino35
The SJC reversed this conviction of first-degree murder, finding
the jury instructions relating to provocation, self-defense, and defense of
another were "either erroneous or misleading and posed a substantial
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.' 13 6 At trial, both sides acknowledged
that the defendant killed the victim, a homeless man whom the defendant
had allowed to temporarily camp on his property. 11 7 The defendant
subsequently stabbed the victim to death after observing the victim engage
in a physical altercation with the defendant's son. 38 The SJC held that the
trial court erroneously placed the burden of proof on the defense by its
provocation instruction, in direct violation of Acevedo. 139
c. Expert Testimony InstructionError
Below is a summary of the one case within this Survey resulting in
reversal based upon jury instruction error relating to expert testimony.
140
Commonwealth v. Hinds

No dispute existed at trial regarding the fact that the defendant shot
and wounded his sister, as well as shot and killed his half-brother and halfbrother's wife. 141 The defense focused on the defendant's mental state at

134

See Commonwealth v. Little, 730 N.E.2d 304, 309 (Mass 2000).

"In Acevedo, we

observed that the difference between a correct instruction on provocation and the incorrect one
given here is 'substantial."' Id. at 309.
135 710 N.E.2d 967 (Mass. 1999).
136 Id. at 968.
137See id. at 969 (reviewing relevant facts of case).
138See id. at 969 (detailing struggle between defendant and victim). The victim hit the
defendant's son with a baseball bat, as well as held a knife to his throat and threatened to kill him.
Id. The intoxicated defendant then appeared outside with a shot gun, attempted to disable the
victim by firing at his leg, and finally wrestled on the ground with the victim he ultimately
gained control of the knife and stabbed the victim. Id.
139See id. at 970 ("On the issue of provocation, the judge gave, virtually word for word, the
instruction which we concluded was erroneous in Acevedo . .
140 875 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 2007).
141See id. at 489 (providing brief history of lower court case). The shootings arose out of a
family dispute over care for the defendant's mother, as well as access to property. Id. at 489-90.
The defendant testified to being afraid of his half brother, and the same day as the shootings a
judge vacated a restraining order the defendant had obtained against him. Id. at 492-93.
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the time of the shooting, specifically his inability to "premeditate
deliberately with malice aforethought," as required for a murder
conviction. 142 The Commonwealth and the defense presented conflicting
expert psychiatric testimony. 143 The trial court's jury instruction said the
facts on which the expert forms an opinion must be proved by the
Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt. 144 In assigning error to this
instruction, the SIC reasoned that the jury was led to believe it was not
permitted to accept the defense expert's testimony unless the underlying
facts were proven by the Commonwealth,
thus undermining any potential
45
validity of the defense expert testimony. 1
B. Sufficiency of Evidence
During the ten-year time frame of this Survey, just two of the
twenty reversals were rooted in sufficiency of evidence concerns.146
Notably, both of these cases involved joint venture liability issues. What
follows is a summary of each case.
14 7

1. Commonwealth v. Cannon

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder under a felony
murder theory for the armed robbery and shooting death of the victim, who
routinely sold the defendant marijuana. 148 The victim's girlfriend, present
at the time of the shooting, testified that she saw the defendant and another
man leave the scene. 149 She overheard some conversation, but did not see
who fired the gun, and testified the defendant looked "surprised and
scared" after the shooting.150 The SIC held that sufficient evidence existed

142 Id. at 493. Defense experts testified the defendant experienced "acute anxiety" related to
his family. Id. The defense argued this anxious state of mind "interfered with the defendant's
mental processes to the point that he was rendered incapable of forming a specific intent to shoot

[the victims]." Id.

See id. at 494 (detailing conflicting experts' testimony at trial).
See id. at 494-95.
145 Commonwealth v. Hinds, 875 N.E.2d 488, 496-97 (Mass. 2007) (noting great importance
of defendant's expert to his case).
146 See supra page 10 tbl. 2 (listing types of issues reversed by SJC over past ten years). See
generally Commonwealth v. Cannon, 869 N.E.2d 594 (Mass. 2007); Commonwealth v. Swafford,
805 N.E.2d 931 (Mass. 2004).
147 869 N.E.2d 594 (Mass. 2007).
148 See id. at 597 (discussing facts of case).
149 See id. at 598.
150 See id. (discussing role of victim's girlfriend as witness to robbery and subsequent
143
144

shooting).
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to support finding the defendant was a joint venturer in the attempted
armed robbery resulting in the victim's death, but insufficient evidence
existed to support concluding the defendant was the shooter.'
Because
the jury did not specify under which theory of felony murder it found the
defendant guilty (joint venturer or principle 52
liability for the shooting), the
SIC reversed the conviction and set it aside. 1
2. Commonwealth v. Swafford

153

Two co-defendants appealed their convictions of first-degree
murder, but the SIC reversed only one defendant's ("Gittens")
conviction. 154 The Commonwealth alleged that Gittens was the driver at
the time of a gang-related shooting, but the only evidence supporting that
theory was that Gittens was the owner of the car used in the shooting; and
Gittens was present when the victim assaulted his friend.155 In reversing
the conviction, the SIC reasoned this evidence was simply
not enough to
56
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 1
C. Denial ofEffectiveness of Counsel
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel account for four of the
twenty reversals within the scope of this Survey. 157 This type of claim had
a 4.04 percent success rate. 158 Procedurally, the cases discussed below are
slightly different from other direct appeals under Section 33E, and involve
an appeal from a denial of a motion for a new trial. 159 Claims of ineffective

151 See id. at 597.

152See Commonwealth v. Cannon, 869 N.E.2d 594, 597 (Mass. 2007) ("We cannot know
whether any juror based the verdict on a legally unsupported theory.").
153805 N.E.2d 931 (Mass. 2004).
154See id. at 933 (discussing court's consideration of both claims on appeal). The two
defendants were members of a local gang in Mattapan, where the shooting took place. Id.
155Id. at 939 n.11 (highlighting limited facts jury had when deliberating on Gittens's
involvement in shooting).
156Id. at 939-41 (reasoning Commonwealth's failure to demonstrate Gittens as driver during
shooting). "Taken as a whole, the evidence does not support Gittens's convictions beyond a
reasonable doubt ....[t]he inferential leaps that the Commonwealth asks are too great." Id. at
941.
157See generally Commonwealth v. Farley, 732 N.E.2d 893 (Mass. 2000); Commonwealth v
Patterson, 739 N.E.2d 682 (Mass. 2000); Commonwealth v. Martin, 696 N.E.2d 904 (Mass.
1998); Commonwealth v. Roberio, 700 N.E.2d 830 (Mass. 1998).
158See supra page 11 tbl. 3 (illustrating success rate of ineffectiveness of counsel challenge).
159See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 33E; see also Greaney & Comerford, supra note 2, at
263 (discussing procedure for filing motion for new trial).
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assistance of counsel are reviewed under a more favorable standard under
Section 33E, allowing the court to consider whether an error was
committed during trial, and if so, whether it was "likely to have influenced
the jury's conclusion.' 6 0
This favorable, non-constitutional standard
potentially allows for reversal, even where the conduct of counsel did not
otherwise constitute conduct "falling measurably below [that] which might
be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer. ,,16 As such, the SIC
considers evidence outside the parameters
of the trial transcript in its
62
consideration of effectiveness of counsel. 1
Denial of effective assistance of counsel accounted for 20 percent
of all reversals within this Survey (a total of four cases), and had a 4.04
percent success rate. 163 Below is a discussion of the four cases within this
Survey resulting in reversal based on denial of effectiveness of counsel.
164
1. Commonwealth v. Farley

At trial, the central defense was that a third party stabbed the
victim to death, and the defendant subsequently found the body. 165 Further,
the female defendant testified to this effect at trial, claiming a drug dealer
named "Rafael" killed the victim.166 There was some physical support for
this theory, including semen found at the crime scene. 167 In finding
ineffective assistance of counsel, the SIC focused on trial counsel's lack of
preparation, failure to investigate the facts in order to provide support for
the defense theory, and "pointless and rambling" cross-examination of a
key prosecution witness. 168 The court ultimately held that defense counsel
"failed to advance the defendant's case effectively
through the use of
69
evidence, testimony, and argument at trial."1

160
161

Commonwealth v.Wright, 584 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Mass. 1992).
Commonwealth v. Saferian, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (Mass. 1974); see also Greaney &

Comerford, supra note 2, at 282 (discussing applicable standard of review for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims under Section 33E).
162 See Greaney & Comerford, supra note 2, at 282.
163 See supra page 11 tbl. 3.
164 732 N.E.2d 893 (Mass. 2000).
166

See id. at 894-95 (recapping relevant facts of case).
Id. at 895 (discussing defendant's version of events).

167

See id. at 895.

168

Id. at 896.
Commonwealth v. Farley, 732 N.E.2d 893, 895-96 (Mass. 2000). ("Trial counsel put

165

169

forth a defense and then failed to develop this defense .... He thereby effectively left the

defendant 'denuded of a defense."') (quoting Commonwealth v. Street, 446 N.E.2d 670, 673
(1983))).
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2. Commonwealth v. Patterson7 '

Here the SJC's reversal based upon denial of effectiveness of
counsel stemmed from a conflict of interest involving trial counsel. 17 1 A
jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder for the shooting death
of a Boston police detective. 172 During the investigation of this crime,
defense counsel attended a police interview with the defendant, at which
the Commonwealth later claimed the defendant made an incriminating
statement. 173 The substance of this interview was introduced at trial.174 In
finding ineffectiveness of counsel, the SJC focused on the fact that defense
counsel was the only potential witness who could have refuted the officer's
version of the police interview, and that as trial counsel, she was prohibited
from doing so. 175 The court cited to ethical rules dictating an attorney

needs to withdraw
as counsel once it becomes clear he or she may be called
76
witness.1
a
as
177

3. Commonwealth v. Martin

The defendant's conviction was based upon evidence that he had
put LSD in the victim's food, causing his death. 178 Defense counsel failed
to challenge the scientific evidence concerning the presence of LSD in the
victim's body, and the prosecution failed to produce medical reports that
conflicted with the Commonwealth's theory. 179 The SJC reversed the
conviction based on defense counsel's failure to cross-examine witnesses
or otherwise challenge the LSD evidence at trial. 180

170 739 N.E.2d 682 (Mass. 2000).
171See id. at 685 (reviewing facts of case).
172See id. A witness discovered the detective's body, who was off duty and working a
security detail for a Roslindale drugstore, inside his personal vehicle in the drugstore parking lot.
Id.
173 Id. at 687 (providing details of interview session with defendant). The attorney later
received a copy of an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant application recounting an
incorrect version of the interview session. Id. The attorney informed the assistant district
attorney the affidavit was not accurate, but subsequently did not withdraw as counsel. Id.
174 See id. at 687.
175 See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 739 N.E.2d 682, 691-92 (Mass. 2000).
176See id. at 692 (noting trial counsel's obligation to withdraw); see also MASS. R. PROF. C.
3.7 (prohibiting lawyer from acting as trial counsel when "likely to be a necessary witness").
177 696 N.E.2d 904 (Mass. 1998).
178See id. at 905 (recapping procedural history and relevant facts).
179 See id.
180 See id. at 908 (stressing defense counsel's poor performance fell below acceptable
constitutional standards).
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4. Commonwealth v. Roberio'8 '
The SJC reversed the defendant's conviction of first-degree murder
for the beating death and robbery of an elderly victim.8 2 Although the
defendant had a history of mental illness, defense counsel failed to
investigate this issue or to raise it at trial, instead relying on his own
conversation with the defendant to determine his mental health.' 3 The SJC
found there was ineffectiveness of counsel, reasoning that because the
defense expert (who testified at the motion for a new trial), if believed by
the jury, could have altered the verdict, trial counsel's failure to pursue this
issue at trial fell measurably below a level of reasonable competency. 184
D. Evidentiary Issues
Evidentiary errors accounted for 23.8 percent of the total number
of reversals in this Survey, and maintained a success rate of 2.82 percent.""
The nature of evidentiary rulings in the context of a criminal trial increases
the likelihood that trial courts will commit error. 186 Specifically, trial
courts are often called upon to interpret the applicable rules of evidence in
a fast-paced jury trial setting, where there is little time for research or
reflection. 187 Additionally, given that the evidence laws in Massachusetts
are governed by common law, and are not codified in a single statute, the
potential for error becomes even greater. '88 Finally, where a recent change
181 700 N.E.2d 830 (Mass. 1998).
182

See id. at 831 (providing overview of facts at trial). The defendant and an accomplice

entered the trailer of the victim, presumably to rob him of cash. Id. The victim was discovered
the next day, beaten with a blunt object and strangled with his pillowcase. Id.
183 Id. at 831 (reviewing steps defense counsel took in conducting evaluation without support
from mental health experts).
184

Id. at 832.

185

See supra page 11 tbl. 3.
See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 21 (discussing relationship between evidentiary

186

rulings and trial error).
Across courts, some issues will always cause problems because of the context in which
they are raised. Evidentiary questions raised during the examination of witnesses are a
classic example. When the parties anticipate a difficult evidentiary ruling, they will
ask for a ruling in limine; here a judge can deliberate before the trial begins. Most of
the time, however, evidentiary or testimonial problems emerge from the moment, the
product of the flow of the questioning. Hence, the judge cannot recess and research an

issue.
Id.
187
188

See NCSC Report, supra note 8, at 21.
See Honorable Peter W. Agnes, Guided Discretion in Afassachustts Evidence Law:
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in the law regarding admissibility of a particular kind of evidence exists,
there is an even greater likelihood of trial court error.'89 Below is a
discussion of the four cases that were reversed based on or due to
evidentiary error.
1. Commonwealth v.Seng

9

The SIC reversed the defendant's first-degree murder conviction
for the shooting death of three of his ex-girlfriend's children. 191 Because
the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress, his statements
came in as evidence. 192 The SIC improperly concluded that reading
Miranda warnings in the defendant's native Khmer language was not
corrected by a subsequent reading of the warnings in English. 193 In
particular, the court reasoned the Khmer version of the warnings
significantly differed from those required under Miranda v. Arizona,194 as
they did not include the defendant's right to remain silent or his right to
have counsel appointed to him if he could not afford his own lawyer. 195
Standardsfor the Admissibility of PriorBad Acts Against the Defendant, 13 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL &

APP. ADvoc. 1, 10-11 (2008) (discussing challenges in identifying relevant rules and laws of
evidence in Massachusetts).
In a common law jurisdiction such as Massachusetts, in which the law of evidence is
scattered throughout the decisions of our appellate courts, in a number of different
chapters of our general laws, and in a myriad of court rules, the task of identifying the
controlling principles of law including the critical areas in which the decision
whether to admit or exclude evidence is committed to the judge's discretion is a
formidable one.
Id. at 10.
189

See Andrew G. Scott, Note, Exclusive Admissibility of Specific Act Evidence in Initial-

Aggressor Self-Defense Cases: EnsuringEquity within the Adjutant Framework, 40 SUFFOLK U.

L. REv. 237, 238 (2006) (noting court's decision in Adjutant "lacked complete instructions to trial
courts as to the application of the new rule"). "As a result ... the majority's decision will result
in unfair prejudice to victims with violent pasts, jury distraction, confusion, delay, and
inconsistency within the jurisdiction's case law." Id. See generally Commonwealth v. Adjutant,
824 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 2005) (reversing conviction because trial court improperly failed to exclude
victim's prior violence in self-defense case).
190766 N.E.2d 492 (Mass. 2002).
191 Id. at 495-96.
192 Id. at 496 (noting defendant's appeal claim of Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations).
The defendant argued his statements to police during a custodial interrogation violated his
constitutional rights because police did not correctly provide Miranda rights in his native
language. Id.
193See id. at 496.
194 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
195

See Commonwealth v. Seng, 766 N.E.2d 492, 498-99 (Mass. 2002)

("[T]he

Commonwealth did not meet its 'heavy burden' . . . of demonstrating that the defendant was
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The court further reasoned that the subsequent contradictory warnings
given in English did not cure this constitutional deficiency. 196
197

2. Commonwealth v. DePace

The SJC reversed the defendant's first-degree murder conviction
for the strangulation death of his estranged wife.' 9 8 Following the victim's
death, the defendant invoked his right to counsel in the course of a police
interview.' 99 The prosecution introduced evidence of the defendant's
invocation of this right at trial without objection and without a curative
instruction. 2 0 In reversing the conviction, the SJC noted "the nature of
Doyle20 1 error is so egregious that reversal is the norm, not the
,,202
exception.
3. Commonwealth v. Mavredakis2 °3
The SJC reversed the defendant's first-degree murder conviction
due to an erroneous admission of the defendant's post-arrest statements to
police. 20 4 The defendant was convicted on a felony-murder theory in the
shooting death of a fast-food restaurant manager during the course of an
armed robbery. 2 5 The defendant's confession, which was obtained in the
course of a police interrogation, was admitted at trial.20 6 The SJC reversed
the conviction, holding that the failure of the police to notify the defendant
of the presence of legal counsel at the station at the time of his confession

advised of his rights in a meaningful way that he could comprehend.").
196 See id. at 499-501 (Mass. 2002) (noting reading in English served only to further confuse
defendant regarding his rights).
197 742 N.E.2d 1054 (Mass. 2001).
198 Id. at 1056.
199 Id. at 1057.
200 Id. at 1060 (noting lack of instruction permitted jury to infer guilt based upon defendant's
request for counsel).
201 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
202 Commonwealth v. DePace,
742 N.E.2d

1054,

1060

(Mass.

2001)

(stating

Commonwealth's lack of justification for using defendant's lawyer request suggests intent to
prejudice defendant).
203 725 N.E.2d 169 (Mass. 2000).
204 Id. at 172.
205 Id. at 172-73 (summarizing relevant facts of robbery and subsequent shooting).
206 Id. at 173 (discussing trial court's denial of motion to suppress evidence). The SJC also
called attention to the fact that the defendant was not apprised of counsel's presence at police
station. Id.
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rendered his Miranda waiver involuntary.2 7 In reaching its conclusion, the
SIC distinguished Moran v.Burbine,208 reasoning that Article 12 should be
more broadly interpreted than the Fifth Amendment.20 9
4. Commonwealth v.Crawford210

The SIC reversed the defendant's conviction for the shooting death
of her boyfriend. 211 The Commonwealth prosecuted the defendant on a
joint venture theory, and it did not allege her to be the shooter.2 12 Prior to
trial, the defense moved to suppress statements made in the course of a
police interrogation, and sought to introduce expert testimony on Battered
Woman's Syndrome in support of the motion.21 3 The trial court excluded
the expert testimony at the motion hearing
and at trial, noting that it was
2 4
unnecessary to determine voluntariness. 1
In reversing the conviction, the SIC found the trial court
erroneously excluded the proffered expert testimony because such
testimony could have informed both the court and the jury about the
defendant's mental state-as someone repeatedly traumatized by domestic
violence and drug abuse.215
5. Commonwealth v. Conkey

216

The SIC reversed the defendant's conviction of first-degree murder
for the strangulation death and sexual assault of the victim. 217 Physical
207

Id. at 179 (determining defendant's knowledge of legal counsel offer of assistance likely

to affect Miranda waiver decision).
208 475 U.S. 412, 413 (1986) (holding no Miranda violation wherein police fail to inform
defendant of counsel).
209 See Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 178-80 (Mass. 2000) (discussing
Article 12 history, purpose and existence prior to drafting of United States Constitution).
210 706 N.E.2d 289 (Mass.1999).
211 Id. at 291.
212 Id. at 290. "Crawford told [police] that her brother had shot the victim because he beat
her, . . . her brother had seen the defendant's bruises from the victim's assault on her that
morning and 'got mad and did what he did."' Id.at 292.
213 See id.at 292-93.
214 See id. at 293 (summarizing trial
court judge's refusal to allow expert testimony).
215 See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 706 N.E.2d 289, 293 -94 (Mass. 1999) (stating judge
cannot rely on own knowledge "of alcoholism, substance abuse, battered woman syndrome, or
other debilitating conditions" for voluntariness determination).
216 819 N.E.2d 176 (Mass.2004).
217 See id.at180-81 (reviewing relevant facts of the assault and murder). The victim was
found inher own apartment,which the defendant admitted to illegally entering on the night of the
murder. Id.
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evidence connected the defendant to the crime scene, but the defendant
claimed to have found the victim's body after the murder. 218 At trial, the
defense was that another person, the victim's landlord, was the actual
assailant.219 In furtherance of this theory, the defense sought to introduce
evidence to establish the landlord's pattern of sexually aggressive
behavior. 220 The SIC reversed his conviction, finding the trial court erred
in excluding this evidence and the error was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.22 '
E. ProsecutorialMisconduct
Prosecutorial misconduct accounted for 10 percent of the
convictions resulting in reversal under this Survey (a total of two cases)
and had a success rate of 2.17 percent.222 These two cases are summarized
below:
3

22
1. Commonwealth v. Coren

The SIC reversed the defendant's first-degree murder conviction
for the shooting death of his friend.224 At trial, the Commonwealth pursued
the theory that the defendant intentionally shot the victim in the abdomen
following a verbal dispute. 225 The defendant provided an alternate version
of the events in a Mirandized statement, which was admitted at trial.226 In
his statement, the defendant said the victim was involved in an altercation
with another man regarding an unpaid debt and this man must have shot the
victim. 227 In his closing argument, the prosecutor re-enacted the shooting,
using language overheard by witnesses, but also added possible victim
statements including "don't" and "don't shoot," which were not supported

218
219
220

See id. at 181.
See id. at 182 (detailing evidence related to landlord's potential involvement in murder).
See id. at 183-84 (discussing exclusion of prior rape allegation against landlord and

sexually explicit items in landlord's apartment).
221 See Commonwealth v. Conkey, 819 N.E.2d 176, 184 -85 (Mass. 2004) (providing analysis
of why landlord evidence improperly disallowed).
222 See supra page 11 tbl. 3 (illustrating success rate of ineffectiveness of counsel challenge).
223 774 N.E.2d 623 (Mass. 2002).
224 See id. at 625.
225 Id. The defendant and victim engaged in an argument over missing drugs in a bedroom.
Id. at 626. A witness observed the defendant holding a gun to the victim's stomach, and
subsequently heard a loud noise "like a firecracker." Id.
226 See id. at 627.
227 Id.
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by the evidence.228 In reversing the conviction, the SIC reasoned the
prosecutor's closing argument misstated the evidence in ways that went
to
229
"the heart of the case" and thus, likely improperly influenced the jury.
0

23
2. Commonwealth v. Farley

The SIC reversed the defendant's first-degree murder conviction
for the stabbing death of her friend. 231 At trial, the defense argued that a
third party stabbed the victim to death and that the defendant subsequently
found the body.232 The female defendant testified to this effect at trial,
claiming that a drug dealer named "Rafael" killed the victim. 233 During
cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecutor repeatedly asked her
about invoking her right to counsel during a police interrogation. 234 While
defense counsel objected, and the judge eventually stopped the questioning,
no curative instruction was given.235 The SIC reversed the conviction,
finding the prosecutor improperly questioned the defendant about this postarrest silence.236
CONCLUSION
In spite of the "extraordinary powers" afforded to the SIC to
review first-degree murder appeals, this Survey supports a finding that
surprisingly few such convictions result in reversal. Legal academics
specializing in criminal law, along with criminal practitioners, can benefit
from a practical understanding of how legal issues relating to homicide law
are addressed at the appellate level. This Survey of first-degree murder
appeals in Massachusetts illustrates that while the SIC rarely invokes the
"extraordinary power" it is afforded under Section 33E, a review of the
cases resulting in reversal is helpful in understanding homicide law.
228
229
230

See Commonwealth v. Coren, 774 N.E. 2d 623, 627-28 (Mass. 2002).
Id. at 629-30.
2000 Mass. LEXIS 178. This case was previously reversed in Commonwelath v. Farley,

732 N.E.2d 893 (Mass. 2000), and for purposes of this Survey these cases are considered as two
separate reversals because each was based on a different trial and different appellate issues. See
supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
231 See Farley, 2000 Mass. LEXIS 178, at *1.
232 Id. at *5.
233 Id.

234 See id. at *6 (detailing cross-examination of defendant).
235 See Commonwealth v. Farley, 2000 Mass. LEXIS 178 at *7."The judge did not instruct
the jury that they could not infer guilt from the defendant's exercise of her right to silence after
being advised of the Miranda warnings." Id.
236 Id. at *7-*11.

